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Moyher and Szyba: From the Rat to the Mouse: How Secondary Picketing Laws May Apply

FROM THE RAT TO THE MOUSE:
HOW SECONDARY PICKETING LAWS MAY
APPLY IN THE COMPUTER AGE
"I know that you're afraid ... you're afraid of us. You're afraid of
change. I don't know the future. I didn't come here to tell you how
this is going to end. I came here to tell you how it's going to begin."
Neo, THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. Pictures 1999).
I. INTRODUCTION

As new technologies develop, necessity and creativity drive
ingenuity to use these new advances in innovative ways. The Internet
has woven itself into the fibers of every day life, becoming one of the
most useful tools in many human endeavors. By virtue of a combination
of necessity and creativity, the Internet has become a useful tool for
labor unions. Websites and e-mail allow unions enhanced abilities to
communicate internally, as well as to communicate with the general
public when labor disputes arise. One type of labor dispute, the
secondary picket, stands to benefit greatly from employing these new
methods of communication.
This Note discusses the development of secondary activity by labor
unions under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and how,
based on the past and current state of the law, courts and the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") may handle future disputes arising
from use of the Internet in these secondary activities. By analyzing the
laws regarding handbilling and picketing, and their extension to banners,
inflatable rats, and street theatre, this Note discusses the extension of
these laws to websites and e-mail. This Note recognizes that there is a
necessity for workable doctrines that will capture the intended policies
of the NLRA and produce logical results, and that will be applicable to
future cases involving use of cyberspace in new and innovative ways in
the secondary picketing context.
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TRADITIONAL METHODS OF SECONDARY PROTEST

Unions use handbills, pickets, and strikes to put pressure on
employers when conflicts and disputes arise.' When the target of this
pressure is a party with whom the direct employer has a business
relationship, such handbilling, picketing, and striking is considered
secondary activity2 and is "one of the most effective weapons in labor's
economic arsenal."3
Secondary activity is regulated by section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 4 of the National Labor Relations Act. 5 The regulation of
secondary activity, commensurate with the degree to which it constitutes
or incorporates speech, is tempered by the publicity proviso 6 as well as
First and Fourteenth Amendment considerations. 7
Labor protests often rely on more than one means of appealing to

1. 2 COMM. ON THE DEV. OF THE LAW UNDER THE NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS ACT, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
1741 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., BNA Books, 5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1746.
4. The current language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA states:
(b)lt shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4) (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title [section 9 of this Act]:
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing[.]
Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
6. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is interpreted with regard to be afforded to the publicity proviso,
which states:
Providedfurther, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in
such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long
as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any
person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick
up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, atthe establishment
of the employer engaged in such distribution.
Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D).
7. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1,at 1742.
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the public.8 Though each method of protest may raise its own distinct
issues, courts and the NLRB will often look at the protest as a whole and
will not dissect the protest into its components. 9 An analysis of the
major methods of protest and how they differ from each other will serve
as the foundation for further analogy to new methods of protest.
A. Pickets
Picketing, 0
considered
the
"workingman's
means
of
communication,"'" is distinguishable from other forms of protest
because it is a combination of communication and conduct.'" The
communication element is generally an argument meant to persuade
other parties to support the picketers. 13 The conduct element in this
context consists of patrolling-a physical presence involving standing or
marching back and forth on or near the property belonging to the party
being picketed.1 4 Of these two elements, the conduct is seen to be the
distinguishing feature of picketing, and is determined to be the more
persuasive of the two.' 5 A picket may be selected precisely because it is

a superior method of inducing action when compared to other forms of
communication, such as newspapers
or circulars, which rely purely on
6
the substance of the argument.'
There is a distinction between the "speech" and "conduct" aspects
of protests. The "speech" aspect implicates awareness of policy and
communicates ideas, whereas the "conduct" aspect crosses the line from
merely communicating a point to doing something about it. The
communication element of picketing implicates First Amendment

8. See generally NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco), Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607

(1980) (involving a combination of picketing and handbilling).
9. Tzvi Mackson-Landsbuerg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful Secondary Picket
Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act? 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 1519,
1541-42 (Dec. 2006).

10. The word "picket" has evolved over time from its military origins several hundred years
ago, through Civil War-era labor protests involving violence, to today's peaceful protests involving
signs and placards. Id. at 1527-28.
11. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 293 (1941).

12. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S.
58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
16. Hughes v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
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freedom of speech rights.1 7 Labor disputes draw attention to issues of
public concern, such as wages, working conditions, and satisfactory
hours. 18 These issues often have narrow as well as broad effects, both
geographically and temporally.' 9 The economy may be affected at a
localized level to a widespread national level. 20 Also, in addition to the
effects on current employees, future employees and future generations
may be affected by the issues underlying these disputes.2"
The conduct involved in picketing may itself induce action,
regardless of the ideas that the picket is meant to communicate.
Coercive conduct is the cornerstone of restrictions on picketing. 23 The
"isolated evil" that flows from such coercive conduct is using a
secondary employer's customers to put economic pressure on the
secondary employer. 24 In turn, the secondary employer would be
coerced to put pressure on the primary employer. 2' Even peaceful
pickets could produce this effect because the public will not pay
attention to the message being communicated and will automatically
stay away from the picketed establishment.26 This activity coerces the
secondary employer to act because of the injury to his business.27
17. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 77 (Black, J., concurring).
18. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The Court relied on these policy reasons in analyzing a statute that prohibited any and
all activity meant to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, including signs, pamphlets, and word of
mouth. Id. at 104-06. The Court determined that such broad restrictions, which were not designed
to combat specific "substantive evils," were thus not a justified proscription of First Amendment
rights. Id. at 104-05.
22. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315
U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S.
58, 68 (1964). A state may prohibit picketing that has a coercive effect due to violence, force, or
intimidation, such as "window-smashing, bombings, bumings, the wrecking of trucks, shootings,
and beatings" committed at the hands of union employees. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi.,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292 (1941). Further, the conduct involved
in picketing may itself induce action, creating a coercive effect on the employer, and opening even
peaceful picketing to restrictions. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 294-95
(1957).
24. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63.
25. Id.
26. ld. at 71.
27. Id. at 72. A peaceful picket of a specific product will not be found to be coercive where
the result may be a drop in sales of one of many items sold by a retailer that would cause an
incidental and insubstantial drop in sales. Id. at 72-73. However, product picketing where the
picketed product comprises almost all of the company's business and that threatens a secondary
employer with ruin or substantial loss may be restricted. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco),
447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980).
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Picketing thus presents a situation where the First Amendment
protections of communication must compete with regulation of the
means of expression. 28 The right of free speech cannot be denied based
on insubstantial facts or trivial incidents. 29 Further, statutes that only
specify a particular manner or location in prescribing expression of
views are not sufficient to justify the restrictions. 30
The First
Amendment would offer no protection if free speech could be restricted
32
so easily. 31 However, free speech may be limited in the labor context.
The restriction may focus on the union's efforts to 33elicit a "response to a
signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea.,
B. Handbills
Handbills, unlike picketing, rely on the persuasive force of the idea
they are attempting to convey. 34 The conduct element is lacking because
handbilling in itself does not involve or rely on a physical presence or
patrolling.35 Without the conduct, there is much less basis to find the
requisite coercion, threat, or restraint necessary to find a NLRA
violation.3 6
A reader's reaction to a message contained in a handbill is the result
of persuasion, not intimidation. 37 The message convinces the reader that
a certain course of conduct is appropriate.38 Information conveyed by
the handbills may persuade their audience to take a certain position, but
that alone is not enough to establish the requisite 'coercion' to restrain
the handbilling.39
The union, like any other party, possesses a right to publicize and

28. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618-19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the considerations
involved in First Amendment protections, as opposed to regulation of the means of expression based
on its content).
29. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 293 (1941).
30. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. d.at 619.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
580 (1988) (discussing the intimidation factor that accompanies the activities of picketing or
patrolling, which is absent from the activity of handbilling).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 578, 580.
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discuss their side of a labor controversy. 40 This right should not be
abridged solely on the basis that the dispute being publicized is a labor
dispute and the entity conducting the handbilling campaign is a labor
union.4 In fact, such publicity furthers the social interest of openly
discussing current labor issues to ensure the fostering of the current and
future workforce.42 Restrictions of labor protests violate the First
Amendment when they are grounded in the fact that a certain view is
expressed.4 3
Handbilling may theoretically be a violation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because of an element of coercion, an but the legislative
history of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) shows that its supporters did not reach
the conclusion that handbills would be restricted. 4 5 Looking to the
nature of handbilling 46 and the policy concerns surrounding labor
disputes, 47 handbilling receives protection rooted both in the First
Amendment as well as in the publicity proviso of the NLRA.4 8
C. Banners
Banners, which remain stationary in front of an establishment being
protested, are compared to either handbilling 49 or picketing. 50 When

40. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S.
58, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
41. See DeBartolo,485 U.S. at 576.
42. See infra Section IV.
43. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring).
44. DeBartolo,485 U.S at 573, 582.
45. Id. at 583-87. The Court discusses the legislative history generally, noting that while
certain opponents of the Landrum-Griffin Act argued at times that the proposal would create broad
restrictions on all types of media, the supporters of the Landrum-Griffin Act did not address this
issue. Id. at 582. Accordingly, the Court rejects this interpretation of the statutory language and
looks to the intent of the sponsors of the legislation to determine its purpose. Id. (citing Tree Fruits,
377 U.S. at 66).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
48. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 588. A contrary reading of the facts of DeBartolo, which the
NLRB supported, would restrict any kind of publicity urging a consumer boycott against a
secondary employer, including appeals made to the public through newspaper, radio, and television.
Id. at 583. Further, under this reading the NLRA would be held to prohibit appeals to customers to
boycott retailers because they employ nonunion contractors, but would then permit the union to
request the same customers not purchase specific items the union had an issue with. Id. The court
could not find a reason as to why Congress would intend such a result. Id.
49. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 1506, 409 F.3d 1199,
1214 (Cal. 2005).
50. Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Case No. 28-CC933/JD(SF)-30-03, 46 (NLRB Div. of Judges, May 9, 2003).
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compared to handbilling, banners deserve greater protection, however,
when banners are equated to picketing they are more susceptible to
restriction.
In certain instances, banners may constitute "signal
picketing" because they indicate to third parties that "sympathetic action
on their part is desired by the union."5t In this context, the banner is
viewed as similar to a picket line in that there is "a visual message
comprehensible at a glance and notice of a labor dispute., 52 However,
with picketing, it is the conduct, as opposed to the persuasive force of
the idea being conveyed, that elicits a response from the listener.53 Thus,
banners face greater restrictions because of the combination of a greater
focus on the conduct of the protestors and a reduced focus on the
substantive message being conveyed by the banner.54
Even with the lack of actual patrolling, banners may be considered
more expressive than picketing.
Labor unions erect banners on
sidewalks ensuring significant exposure without blocking entrances to
businesses, thus lessening physical interactions with customers and
eliminating confrontations with passers-by. 55 Nevertheless, passers-by
can avert their eyes from banners if they do not want to see them in the
same way that they can avert their eyes from billboards or other signs on
the street. 56 "[R]eliance on the physical presence of speakers in the
vicinity of the individuals they seek to persuade . . . is a consideration
that, standing alone, is no basis for lowering the shield of the First
57
Amendment or turning communication into statutory 'coercion."',
Thus, while these banners do not "have any other characteristic that
clearly 'threatens, restrains, or coerces' those who see the
communication," and although the banners may implicitly signal the
presence of a dispute to third parties, they constitute neither conductwhich may be restricted-nor signal picketing.58

51. Local 1827, Case No. 28-CC-933/JD(SF)-30-03 at 46.
52. Id.
53. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619
concurring).
54. Local 1827, Case No. 28-CC-933/JD(SF)-30-03 at 46.
55. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 409 F.3d 1199, 1213-14 (Cal.
56. Id.; see Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that the burden generally falls upon
his/her eyes from something he/she may find offensive).
57. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214-15.
58. Id.
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D. Rats and Street Theatre
An employer who chooses to conduct its business without union
involvement is considered a "rat" employer by the union.5 9 The union
may inflate a giant rat balloon outside of the employer's place of
business to protest the employer's decision to circumvent union
involvement. 60 Similarly, street-theatre performances, typically mock
funerals, are used to dissuade prospective customers from patronizing
the targeted employer. Street theatre may be considered the functional
equivalent of picketing, 61 and thus conduct that can be restricted, for the
same reason. 62 However, a constitutional challenge to local restrictions
on activities such as the use of inflatable rats and street theatre may be
avoided where the restriction pertains to the general location and manner
of signs, but allows protestors alternative means of conveying their
message, such as through handbills.63
The display of giant rat balloons, meant to pressure neutral
employers, may itself amount to the type of picketing prohibited by the
secondary boycott rule.64 Thus, the presence of protestors in the vicinity
of a giant rat balloon may be found to constitute a form of picketing,
allowing a court to sidestep the issue of whether the rat balloon itself is a
form of picketing.6 5 On the other hand, the inflatable rat may deserve
First Amendment protection when erected on public property.6 6 This
determination is based on the unique nature of the rat balloon as a tool
exclusively used in protests, typically short in duration, and not causing
any danger.67 The highly communicative aspect of the inflatable rat
constitutes non-commercial speech of a labor protest and may thus be
protected.68

59. William J. Emanuel & Debra L. Schroder, Union "'FuneralProcession" Violates
Secondary Boycott Law-Are Rats and Banners Next?, INSIGHT: A LITTLER MENDELSON REPORT 1,

1 (May 2006), availableat http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/14086.pdf.
60. Id.
61. "Picketing may be found to occur where a small number of persons actively engage in
patrolling-back and forth movement--establishing a form of barrier at the site in question."
Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253 (2006).
62.

Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, AFL-CIO, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265

(11 th Cir. 2005).
63. See State v. Deangelo, 930 A.2d 1236, 1245-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); see also
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

64. See Emanuel & Schroder, supra note 59 at 2.
65. Id.
66. Tucker v. Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457,462-63 (6th Cir. 2005).
67. Id.
68. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 150 v. Orlando Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950, 958
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III. ELECTRONIC PROTESTS AND COMMUNICATIONS IN NON-LABOR
CONTEXTS

Since the 1990s the Internet has quickly provided an accessible
forum for people from various backgrounds to disseminate their ideas
worldwide with absolute ease. 69 Websites are often used to voice social
and political views, as well as to call attention to grievances with
particular organizations. One such method is the use of "sucks" sites.7 °
These sites often incorporate the word "sucks" with the name of the
organization against whom the grievance is directed. 71 Another method
72
employs the use of a name very similar to that of the protested party.
Protesters seeking a more active method of gaining attention may

employ e-mail, which includes both direct and spain e-mail.73 Such
methods are necessary for protesters seeking to stand out from the vast
amounts of information on the Internet and are treated as an extension of
leafleting and mass mailing.74
Congress has estimated that unsolicited commercial e-mail
comprises over half of all electronic mail generated.7 5 These unsolicited
e-mails come with added costs to recipients in the form of storage costs
on their e-mail accounts, time spent accessing and reviewing these
messages, and time spent discarding them once they are discovered to be
nothing more than unwanted annoyances.7 6 While many states enacted
legislation to curb the proliferation of unsolicited e-mails, those efforts
have largely failed because of their varying standards and
requirements. 77 In response to this inconsistency, Congress enacted the
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing
Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM Act"), which sought to preempt many of the
state regulations, except those that regulate deceptive advertising.78
(N.D. 111.2001).
69. See Seth F. Kreimer, Note, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the
FirstAmendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 120-21 (2001).
70. Id. at 152.
71. Id. at 152-53 (for example, "Lucentsucks.com" or "walmartsucks.com").
72. Id. (for example, www.peta.org was once operated by "People Eating Tasty Animals").
73. Id. at 144-45.
74. Id. at 144.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2006).
76. Id. § 7701(a)(3).
77. Id. § 7701(a)(1 1).
78. Id. §§ 7701-13. The CAN-SPAM Act bans false or misleading header information,
prohibits deceptive subject lines, requires that your e-mail give recipients an opt-out method, and
requires that commercial e-mails be identified as an advertisement and include the sender's physical
postal address. Id. § 7704. The CAN-SPAM Act applies to all commercial electronic messages that

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

9

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:271

The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits messages containing false or
misleading header information.7 9 Under the CAN-SPAM Act, header

information is defined as "the source, destination, and routing
information attached to an electronic mail message, including the
originating domain name and originating electronic mail address, and
any other information that appears in the line identifying, or purporting
to identify, a person initiating the message." 80 Thus, senders of e-mail

are responsible for falsified headers. 8' Additionally, if the subject line of
the e-mail is deceptive, the sender will similarly be found to be in
violation of section 7704(a) of the CAN-SPAM Act, which makes it

unlawful for any person to:
initiate the transmission to a protected computer of a commercial
electronic mail message if such person has actual knowledge, or
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that
a subject heading of the message would be likely to mislead a
recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about82a material
fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the message.

Even if both the header and subject line of the e-mail message are
accurate, a sender may still be held liable under the CAN-SPAM Act if

access to the message was obtained through false or fraudulent
pretenses. 83 Courts have begun to review this claim and are starting to
form an interpretation of this particular section of the statute. 84 Such

are sent, which means "any electronic message the primary purpose of which is the commercial
advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service (including content on an Internet
website operated for a commercial purpose)." Id. § 7702(2)(A). If the recipient does not want to
receive any future e-mails from the sender, they are allowed to opt out of receiving them because
the sender is required to provide the receiver with a return e-mail address or another Internet based
return mechanism where the receiver can ask that the sender not send future messages. Id. §
7704(a)(3). The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits the sending of commercial e-mail without a functioning
electronic return mail address, active for at least thirty days following the message where the
receiver can send a request to not receive any further messages. Id.
79. Id. § 7704(a)(1).
80. Id. § 7702(8).
81. See U.S. v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057 (D. Ariz. 2007) (finding that defendants
knowingly materially falsified header information in multiple unsolicited commercial e-mails, or
spam, containing pornographic images and intentionally initiated the transmission of these e-mails,
in violation of the CAN-SPAM Act).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2).
83. Id. § 7704(a)(l)(A).
84. MySpace, Inc. v. Wallace, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that
Congress intended to prohibit not only sending messages with inaccurate header information, but
also sending messages with accurate header information, access to which was obtained through
false or fraudulent pretenses).
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opinions have focused on the intent of the sender to disguise their86
85
identity from the receiver of the e-mail. In MySpace, Inc. v. Wallace
the defendant was misleading people via his personal website, which
falsely resembled the popular social-networking site of MySpace.com,
and thus lured people into entering their own email addresses in an effort
to access their MySpace.com accounts . 7 The defendant then used this
information to log into the accounts of those people and send 400,000
spain messages from those accounts.88 In this instance, there was no
allegation of a false and misleading subject line or header, but the way in
which the e-mail addresses were obtained was fraudulent, which was
enough for a violation of the CAN-SPAM Act. 89
Courts have also begun to view the sending of unsolicited e-mails
as a tortious act. In America Online Inc. v. IMS,90 the common law tort
of trespass was applied in the context of electronic communications. 91
The court found that the defendant, an owner of a marketing company,
committed trespass to chattels against an Internet Service Provider's
92
network by sending sixty million unauthorized advertisements.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines, trespass to chattels as
"(a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling
with a chattel in the possession of another., 93 America Online's
analysis, relying on the Restatement, created a framework for trespass to
chattels as applied to unsolicited e-mails, by finding that the defendant
intentionally caused contact with the computer network, injured the
goodwill of the plaintiff, and diminished the value of its possessor
interest in its computer network. 94 Even if the unsolicited e-mail does
not physically damage the receiver or Internet Service Provider's

85.

Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 17 (2003) (stating that one purpose of section

7704(a)(1)(A) "is to eliminate the use of inaccurate originating e-mail addresses that disguise the
identities of the senders.")).
86.

498 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

87. Id. at 1301.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
91. Id. at 550; Majorie Shields, Annotation, Applicability of Common-Law Trespass Actions
to Electronic Communications, 107 A.L.R. 5th 549, 559 (2003).
92. America Online, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550.

93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(a)-(b) (1965).
94. America Online, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
218(b)); see also Thrifty-Tel Inc., v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996);
Indiana v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985) (rejecting defendant's distinction between the
use of a hammer and the use of a computer in a trespass to chattels action); Washington v. Riley,
846 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Wash. 1993) (defining "computer trespass").
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property, it may still be trespass to chattels because it causes the value of
the equipment to diminish.95 Further if the service providers cannot
measure the exact amount of damage that was caused by these
unsolicited e-mails, they still may have a trespass to chattels cause of
action if the sending of unsolicited e-mails caused substantial delays in
the delivery of all Internet mail to the subscribers of that Internet
service. 96
While the First Amendment is a commonly claimed defense for
sending unsolicited e-mails, 97 in certain circumstances it has proved
unviable. 98 For example, a private company desiring to send unsolicited
e-mails will not be protected by the constitution where other forms of
communication are readily available to convey the intended message. 99
Thus, if a court finds there are alternative means of communication
available to the sender, the First Amendment likely will not protect the
sender of bulk unsolicited e-mails.
E-mail has posed a problem for courts, which have yet to determine
how the sender's and receiver's rights to privacy will be defined. 100 The
courts struggle with the application of privacy concepts in this context
because while e-mail can be seen to substitute for oral or written
communication, it also possesses the characteristic of being savable and
accessible to system operators or others. 01 In addition, such e-mails can
by either the sender or
be printed or easily re-transmitted to a third party
102
receiver anyone the receiver or sender chooses.
Due to these unique challenges, courts have attempted to clarify
when privacy rights attach to e-mails. 10 3 The court of the United States
Armed Forces, for example, decided that "[e]xpectations of privacy in email transmissions depend in large part on the type of e-mail involved

95. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
96. America Online v. Prime Data Services Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-1652-A, 1998 WL 34016692,
at *2-3 (E.D. Va. 1998).
97. See CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1025 (defendant argued First Amendment protected
right to send unsolicited commercial e-mails to plaintiff's computer systems); see also Shields,
supra note 91 at 560-61.
98. CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
99. Id.
100.

See Ian Ballon, What's in a Name: Domain Names, Trademarks and Related New Media

Law Issues, in REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COMPANY 2000, at 297, 412 (PLI Intellectual Prop.,
Course Handbook Series, No. G-587, 2000) (discussing the mode of communication that e-mail
replaces).
101. Id.
102.
103.

Id.

Id.
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and the intended recipient."' 0 4 Messages that are sent to the public-atlarge in chat rooms, or that are forwarded, lose their privacy rights.'0 5
The court made a strong distinction between e-mail that is sent from
computer to computer, and those that are sent to an account maintained
by a third party. 106 E-mails that are sent to an account maintained by a
third party are entitled to more privacy than other messages because they
are "privately stored for retrieval on [a third party's] centralized and
privately-owned computer bank."' 7 Thus, the e-mail sent to a thirdparty account is similar to a letter in that after the author sends the email, it "lies sealed in the computer until the recipient opens his or her
computer and retrieves the transmission."'' 0 8
Conversely, e-mail
messages that are sent through the Internet and pass through a "less
secure system, in which messages must pass through a series of
computers in order to reach the intended recipient," do not receive as
much protection under the right to privacy because they are viewed as
moving through the public domain. 0 9
IV.

APPLICATION OF CURRENT LAWS TO SECONDARY PROTESTS IN THE
LABOR CONTEXT

The law relating to the use of the Internet in the labor context is still
in the early stages of infancy. Looking to recent developments is
instructive in getting a sense of how it will start to develop. The Internet
is already being used to aid unions in their efforts to organize, manage
affairs, and voice grievances. The following discussion presents some of
the issues that unions and employers may face in the years to come.
A. Websites
Unions, like many organizations in the twenty-first century, use
websites and the Internet in their regular course of business. 10 Like any

104.

United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418-19 (U.S. Armed Forces 1996).

105.

Id. at 419.

106. Id. at 417.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 418.
109. Id. at 417. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (analogizing e-mail

to sending a specified individual a first class letter).
110. See, e.g., Justice at the FORUM Home Page, http://www.justiceattheforum.com (last
visited Dec. 28, 2008); Starbucks Union Home Page, http://www.starbucksunion.org/ (last visited
Dec. 28, 2008); Communications Workers of America Home Page, http://www.cwa-union.org/ (last
visited Dec. 28, 2008); Writers Guild of America, West Home Page, http://www.wga.org/ (last
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other website, union websites may be created for various purposes and
may contain a plethora of information available to the website's visitors.
Beyond listing basic information about the union, such websites often
discuss current issues that are important to that union as well as
grievances that particular union may currently have with employers. For
example, the Writers Guild of America website"' listed the issues
involved with the 2007-2008 television writers strike,1 12 information on
picketing locations, as well 13as any progress that was made in the dispute
that gave rise to the strike.'
Websites offer labor unions major benefits. Like other protest
websites, union websites attract like-minded individuals who identify
with their causes and grievances without being hindered by geography,
and are able to provide support to strengthen the commitments of
individuals who are already members of the group. 1 4 Websites allow
the union to help organize their "offline activities" by providing
members and sympathizers with easy access to information as to when
and where to report for a protest.' 15 Websites have also been helpful in
providing support for the activities of union affiliated organizations,
such as Working America, a "community affiliate" of the American
Federation of Labor.1 16 Additionally, unions have assisted in the
establishment of "virtual unions" such as WashTech, a Communication
Workers of America project that focused on Microsoft Corporation
employees. 117
Despite the benefits, union websites face a unique problem. Just as
leafleting and banners seek to persuade listeners to sympathize with the
visited Dec. 28, 2008).
111. Writers Guild, supra note 110.
112. Id. See also Bonnie Goldstein, Hollywood Bosses Go On Strike, SLATE, Nov. 5, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2177507/.
113. Writers Guild, supra note 110.
114. Kreimer, supra note 69, at 131.
115. Id. at 135. For example, the Writers Guild of America West Home Page included a
prominent hyperlink entitled "Picketing Locations and Schedule" for the duration of their strike.
Writers Guild, supra note 110. Similarly, The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, Local 33, is embroiled in a lengthy dispute with the Faithful Central Bible Church, who
owns the Forum, which is an arena in Inglewood, California. Justice at the FORUM, supra note
110. The union's website lists a schedule of picket times, contains video clips of news reports
regarding the labor protest, and appeals to other unions employed by The Forum to show support.
Id.
116. Alan Hyde, Symposium, New Institutions For Worker Representation in the United
States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 389 (2005-2006); Working America Home
Page, http://www.workingamerica.org/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
117. Hyde, supra note 116, at 390; Washington Alliance of Technology Workers Home Page,
http://www.washtech.org/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
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union's position, websites rely on the persuasive force of the information
they contain.' 18 Unlike leafleting and banners, websites compete with
several billion other websites for attention." 19
The "cyberpicket" has emerged as an option for labor unions
engaging in a protest of an employer, and certain technological methods
may be employed to capitalize on the Internet's wide reach while
mitigating the risk of receiving no attention, as had occurred in the
Canadian case British Columbia Automobile Association v. O.P.E.I.U.,
Local 378.120 There, the union had developed a website which used the
trademarked logo of the British Columbia Automobile Association
("BCAA") 12' and had employed the use of meta tags 2 to attract the
attention of Internet users.1 23 Additionally, the union designed the
website to closely resemble the BCAA's website. 124 The dispute
between the union in this case related to a bargaining agreement, 25 but
the court's analysis relating to the use of a website, as opposed to a
leafleting campaign or a picket line, may be instructive for future
cyberpicket cases in the secondary boycott context, partly
because the
126
analysis.
its
in
decisions
court
U.S.
on
heavily
court relied
The employer in British Columbia Automobile Ass'n claimed there
had been three types of wrongful conduct:
(a) copyright infringement in connection with the defendant's first and
second [web]sites through the unlawful reproduction of the plaintiff's
design elements, from its website;

118. Kreimer, supra note 69, at 144.
119. Id. at 143.
120. [2001] 85 B.C.L.R.3d 302 (Can.).
121. Id.at 2.
122. Meta tags are HTML codes that are included in the website by the creator that is meant to
serve as a description of the contents of the website. Id. at 32; Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W.
Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). The meta tags are not visible on the
website, but instead serve to attract the attention of Internet search engines when an Internet user
inputs certain criteria for a search. B.C. Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d 32; Brookfield Conmc'n,
Inc., 174 F.3d at 1045. In turn, the search engine produces results for the Internet user based on
matches with meta tags, and serves to attract the attention of the Internet user to the website or
websites containing the key words from the search. B.C. Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d
32;
Brookfield Commc "n,
Inc.,
174 F.3d at 104.
123. B.C.Auto.Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d 32.
124. Id. 43.
125. Id. 14.
126. See infra
text accompanying footnotes 154-63.
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(b) passing-off127 through the unlawful reproduction of the plaintiffs
registered trade-marks and certification marks, and through the
makeup of its website; and
(c) depreciation of the plaintiffs goodwill in its trade-marks ....128
During the course of the dispute with the employer, the union
29
changed the website twice in response to the employer's objections,
presumably in an attempt to avoid legal liability.
Throughout the dispute, the website remained accessible at
"www.bcaaonstrike.com,"
"www.picketline.com,"
and

"www.bcaabacktowork.com.'

30

Additionally, meta tags referencing the
BCAA were employed to attract attention to the union's dispute. 13 The
graphic designs of the union's website, viewable to the Internet user,
were purposely made to resemble the BCAA's website and contained
2
some of BCAA's trademarked materials.13

The union described its intent in employing references to BCAA in
various areas relating to the website as a strategy "to make the [u]nion
site popular with search engines so that it would achieve a high rank in

search results," resulting in "bringing [the] internet site to the attention
of the public."'' 33 Further, the use of the BCAA's name, both in the
domain name and in the contents, was intended to identify who the
dispute was with and what the nature of the dispute was. 134 Comparing

the website to a leafleting campaign,' 35 "the [u]nion argue[d] that the use
of the domain names and meta tags [was] the only method by which the

[u]nion [could] position itself to put its message before people visiting
127. Passing-off is a tort which "concerns misrepresentations by one party which damage the
reputation and goodwill of another party." B.C Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d 56. The tort consists
of three components: "[tlhe existence of reputation or goodwill at the relevant time," "[a]
misrepresentation leading the relevant public to believe there is a business association or connection
between the parties," and "[d]amage or potential damage flowing to the plaintiff as a result of any
misrepresentation due to loss of control its reputation is presumed." Id.
128. Id. 15.
129. Id. 4.
130. Id. 48.
131. Id. 62.
132. Id. 1 43. The color scheme of the first version of the union's website was identical to that
of the employer. Id. 192. Additionally, the "website was divided into five frames," which were
identical to the employer's website. Id. 1 195. The designer of the union website had used the
employer's website as a reference, as he was told to create a website that was similar by a senior
union representative. Id. 1198.
133. Id. 162.
134. Id. 166.
135. Id. 108.
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the employer's website."'
The court determined that the first version of the website, which
was nearly identical to the BCAA's website, established that the union
acted to purposely deceive those who may have been searching for the
BCAA website. 137 Beyond the visual likeness, the website contained a
caption stating "Greetings, BCAA is on Strike" and replicated the meta
tags from the BCAA website, including "references that had nothing to
do with the [u]nion site.' 138 In addition to tort liability, the court found
the similarities to the employer's website to constitute copyright
infringement, 139 rejecting the union's defense that this
40 constituted
1
website.
BCAA
the
of
parody
and
BCAA
criticism of the
The second version of the union website resulted from changes in
response to the employer's demand that the union stop using the
employer's intellectual property. 14 1 The BCAA logo was changed from
uppercase lettering, which was identical to the BCAA's logo, to
lowercase lettering. 142 Further, the slogan "Greetings, BCAA is on
strike" was moved so that it would not be visible on a typical computer
144
screen.143 These minor changes led the union to avoid tort liability,
145
but were insufficient to avoid liability for copyright infringement.
The third version of the union website contained major changes to
visually distinguish the union website from the BCAA's website. 146 The
union removed certain references to the BCAA from the meta tags and
changed some of the wording to be distinctly different from the BCAA's
website and more in line with the union's message. 147 The differences
were significant enough that the employer did not assert that the third
website infringed the employer's copyrights. 48 The changes in
appearance also reduced any chance of misleading the public and thus
fell outside the scope of tort liability. 49 Additionally, neither the third
website nor the previous two versions were found to constitute a
136. Id.

112.

137.

211.

Id.

138. Id. 211-12.
139. Id. 206.
140. Id.91204-05.
141. Id. 145-46.
142. Id. 46.
143.

Id.

144.

Id. 213.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. 206.
Id. 47.
Id.
Id. 50.
See id. 208.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

17

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 10
288

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:271

50
diminution of the employer's trademarks.
In reaching these conclusions, the court sought to strike a
"reasonable balance . . . between the legitimate protection of a party's
intellectual property and a citizen's or a [u]nion's right of expression,"'' 5'
finding that the union's websites were not operated for "commercial
purposes," but rather as "commercial criticism. 1 52 The court looked to
various cases for insight on how to approach the union's references to
1 53
the BCAA in the domain name and meta tags.
Looking to the Southern District of New York's BigStar
Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 5 4 the British Columbia
Automobile Ass'n court noted that despite the fact that close similarities
in domain names may exist, the drastic differences in the products or
services that are being offered on the websites eliminate confusion of
consumers. 55 The court noted, based on the District Court of New
Jersey's analysis in Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 156 critical commentary
may include a trademark as long as it is "not [being] used in a deceptive
or confusing manner."'' 57 The court distinguished the use of a domain
name and meta tags containing another party's trademarks for
descriptive purposes, as the Southern District of California did in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 58 from the use of trademarks to
divert business from another party by deception. 59 The use of another
party's trademark in meta tags may be necessary to enable Internet users
60
to reach certain websites, as in the cases of consumer commentary.
Consumers would be unable to access websites containing consumer
commentary if the use of all trademarks were prohibited.'16 Without the
trademarks in a domain name or meta tag, Internet searches would lack
the requisite code to find the websites containing consumer commentary;

150. Id. 168.
151. Id. 130.
152. Id. 70.
153. Id. 68.
154. 105 F. Supp. 2d 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
155. B.C. Auto. Ass 'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d
82-83 (citing BigStar Entm 't, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d at
209-10).
156. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.J.), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
157. B.C. Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d
84-86 (citing Jewsfor Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 301).
158. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal.), affd, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998).
159. B.C. Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d
97-100 (citing Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1103-04;
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *16-18 (E.D. Va.
1998)).
160. Id. 106 (citing Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165
(C.D. Cal. 1998)).
161. Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
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thus, cutting off those websites from everyone except the "most savvy of
Internet users. 162 In effect, the use of trademarks may be necessary to
identify the target of the consumer commentary
while engaging in
63
speech that enjoys First Amendment protection.
Moving forward, courts and the NLRB may consider some of these
factors when addressing the use of websites in the context of secondary
picketing, as the Supreme Court of British Columbia did in the context
of a union protest with a primary employer. Though a website may be
compared to handbilling, 164 or may be intended as "the virtual equivalent
of a picket line,"' 165 a direct analogy cannot be made. Rather, a website
may be determined to combine elements of both picketing and
handbilling, as well as elements of banners used by unions. Once a
determination is made as to the qualities a website possesses, the next
step is to determine whether the website falls within the publicity
proviso of the NLRA's provision regarding 66unfair labor practices
committed by unions and similar organizations. 1
Similar to handbilling, a website's effectiveness depends on the
persuasive force of the message it contains.167
This parallel to
handbilling may help guide a court, or the NLRB, towards finding that a
website is a permissible secondary protest. The policy behind permitting
handbills, 68 likewise, supports a permissible disposition towards
websites, as websites may also present a means of bringing a current
labor dispute to light in the public eye and help promote protections of
present and future workers. Additionally, there does not appear to be an
element of conduct that is readily ascertainable with websites. Any
conduct associated with the creation of the website could similarly be
attributed to the creation of a handbill, picket sign, or banner. Despite a
court's willingness to curtail impermissible conduct, a court would be
hard pressed to define conduct in such a manner that would not also
apply to handbills. Though there are differences in the manner in which
a handbill is created and how a website is created by virtue of the
differences in the choice of media, these distinctions should not be used

162. Id.
163. Id.at 1167.
164. B.C. Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d

108.

165.

Id. 204.

166.
167.

National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000).
See generally NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S.

607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the effectiveness of handbills relies on their
power of persuasion); B.C. Auto. Ass'n, 85 B.C.L.R.3d
164 ("[The union was] attempting to
persuade members of the public not to do business with [the employer]").
168. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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to justify impeding the use of websites.
Unlike handbills, websites may offer unions options relating to
content that are only limited by the website designer's imagination. In
addition to text, a website can offer the ability to include pictures,
graphics, audio, and video relating to the matters in dispute. These
elements may open the door for courts and the NLRB to find
characteristics that allow more leeway in characterizing certain elements
of the website as impermissible. For example, the posting of pictures or
videos of employees who are not involved in an actual protest may be
determined to be a method of intimidation or harassment. 169 Though the
NLRB has held that such activity is not necessarily a violation of the
NLRA, 170 future cases may result in the NLRB finding this activity is
outside the permissible bounds of the NLRA and thus, may be restricted.
Websites differ from other forms of protest in yet another way. All
websites in cyberspace are equally accessible, and all compete for the
attention of Internet users. 171 The distinguishing element is that users
access the Internet to seek information, at which point websites compete
to attract the user's attention. 172 Thus, the initial decision to access the
Internet is attributable to the Internet user. This distinguishing feature
may be a factor courts and the NLRB weigh when determining whether
the union engaged in reprehensible conduct. The conduct involved in
the Internet user accessing the website, regardless of the act of designing
the website, may be attributable to the Internet user, not to the union.
Under this type of analysis, the website may be viewed as no more than
a source of information made available to those who seek it, as opposed
to an active attempt to attract attention, and thus, deserving protection
under Thornhill.173 Other websites may be designed to be more
proactive in seeking the attention of Internet users, as was the website in
British Columbia Automobile Ass'n.
Capitalizing on the name
recognition of an employer or secondary employer, using meta tags, or
posting links on other prominent sites, union websites may be
analogized to an aggressive picket in which strategic choices are made to

169. Metro. Reg'l Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity, United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am., 335 N.L.R.B. 814, 825 (2001), enforced, 50 Fed. App'x 88 (3d Cir. 2002).
170. Id.
171. Kreimer, supranote 69, at 142-43.
172. See id. at 148.
173. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940) (finding a statute that prohibited any
and all activity meant to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, including signs, pamphlets, and word
of mouth, unconstitutional because such broad restrictions, which were not designed to combat
specific "substantive evils," were thus not a justified proscription of First Amendment rights).
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divert and capture the public's attention.174 Courts and the NLRB may
rely on this approach to find that the conduct element is satisfied because
using employers' names and meta tags causes union protest sites to be
thrust upon Internet users. This type of analysis may result in the
determination that such methods are analogous to the union
impermissibly delivering protest information in place of the services or
information that was requested from the employer by a customer.
In the context of secondary picketing, the publicity proviso of the
NLRA may be used to determine the issue of whether and to what extent
a website may be used by a union. A website may be limited to the
extent that it may "threaten, coerce, or restrain" 175 a party, but may be
protected to the extent that the website is used for the "purpose of
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a
labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and
are distributed by another employer."' 176 Looking to this language, a
court or the NLRB may determine that an informational website is a
method of reaching the public that should be protected, barring content
on the website that would indicate coercion or threats.
To the extent that neither courts nor the NLRB have decided how to
treat websites involved in secondary picketing, employers have little
guidance on how to proceed in the event that they are involved in such a
protest. Additionally, any analysis will depend on factual evidence
surrounding the design of the website, the content of the website, and the
technical characteristics of the website. Looking to British Columbia
Automobile Ass'n, employers may have limited options when dealing
with a website that contains the equivalent of consumer commentary
meant to apprise the general public of a labor dispute. Use of
trademarks and copyrighted information may be limited to some degree,
but the use of an employer's name and other factual information may
prove to be difficult to curtail. 177 Accordingly, employers may find it
difficult to limit the use of websites used in a secondary protest.
Policies surrounding secondary protests will likely induce courts
and the NLRB to fashion rules that will be permissive of websites
employed in such a context. As long as websites are not found to
amount to coercion, harassment, or threats, and are truthful with regards

174.

See Kreimer, supranote 69, at 148-49.

175.

National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (2000).

176.
177.

Id. § 158(b)(4).
See Kreimer, supranote 69, at 154-55.
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to the facts that are presented, courts and the NLRB would find it
difficult to justify limiting use of websites. Websites will likely prove to
be an extremely valuable tool to unions seeking to publicize secondary
grievances because they are likely to be protected by the NLRA, and
because they allow the union to reach a much greater audience.
B. E-mail
Like handbilling, e-mail is a method of distributing information to
audience members deserving more protection. Both are vehicles for
ideas to be communicated, and it has been established that the means to
facilitate the flow of ideas is not as important in light of constitutional
free speech considerations as discussed in Thornhill. 78 The ideas being
communicated are the focus of the constitutional analysis, despite the
179
physical or electronic means employed to communicate these ideas.
Accordingly, the courts may look to the coerciveness of the
communicated ideas themselves, or may focus on the protection afforded
by the publicity clause.
Different types of e-mail, such as spam e-mail, may be subject to
distinct treatment by the NLRB or courts. 80 Spam e-mail is not directed
at any particular recipient, but essentially is a mass mailing into
cyberspace, which is comparable to dropping several hundred thousand
handbills over a city.181 In light of legislation to regulate spam

82

there is

a strong possibility a court or the NLRB may find spam e-mails to be a
violation of the NLRA or another statute meant to curb the use of e-mail
in advertising
campaigns that result in a nuisance to anyone with an e83
mail inbox.'
Another possible distinction may arise from the inclusion of 8a4
hyperlink in an e-mail that otherwise contains general information.
Although, similar to a handbill, where a message is delivered to a
recipient, the e-mail requires the recipient to expend energy to

178. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104-05.
179. See id. at 102 (citations omitted).
180. See, e.g., Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (discussing span e-mail); Guard Publ'g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip
op. at 5 (Dec. 16, 2007) (discussing whether employees are afforded the right to utilize workplace email for activity covered by section 7 of the NLRA).
181. See Optinrealbig.com, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
182. See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13 (2006).
183. See Optinrealbig.com, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40.
184. See Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hyperlink (last visited Oct.
13, 2008).
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investigate further to obtain more information. This distinction may
prove to be fruitless because a handbill could also contain contact
information, a web address, or other instructions on how to access
additional information. Though the hyperlink itself may be another link
in the communication chain that may induce conduct, it may be
considered information that deserves First Amendment protection. A
contrary analysis would produce a strange result in that the actual
information at issue would be protected, but the method of accessing
would amount to a violation of the law.
Employees belonging to a union should regularly communicate in
order to remain informed about union business and activities, and to
improve productivity and performance. 185 However, there are many
employers who have incorporated company-wide Internet-usage policies
preventing the use of e-mail for non-business-related purposes. 186 In
December 2007, the NLRB, for the first time, analyzed whether an
employer e-mail policy, which prevented employees from conducting
187
union business, violated the NLRA.
Under section 7 of the NLRA,
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment ....

188

The Supreme Court has interpreted this section broadly to cover
1 89
many different activities that employees are protected in performing.
185.

See AFL-CIO,

Unions are Good

for Business,

Productivity and

http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/why/uniondifference/uniondiff8.cfm#_ftn5

the

Economy,

(last visited Jan. 1,

2009) (citing Saul A. Rubinstein, The Impact of Co-Management on Quality Performance: The
Case of the Saturn Corporation, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 197, 197 (1999)); North Shore Labor
Council, Young Union Leaders Attend Massachusetts AFL-CIO Inaugural Futures Convention,

http://nslaborcouncil.org/young-union-leaders-attend-massachusetts-afl-cio-inaugural-futuresconvention (last visited Jan. 1, 2009).
186.

See Guard Publ'g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 16,

2007).

187.

Id., slip op. at 5.

188.
189.

National Labor Relations Act § 7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1975) (ruling that employees are

allowed to request union representation at an investigatory interview when the employee believes
the end result will be a decision to discipline the employee and the employer's refusal to allow such
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Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, for example, states that it is "an unfair
labor practice for an employer to ... interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] ...."190
In Register Guard,19 1 the NLRB took this section into consideration in
determining the issue of using company e-mail to conduct "union
business." 192

There, the employer created a company-wide Internet

communications policy which disallowed the use of "[c]ompany
communication systems . . . to solicit or proselytize for commercial

ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations, or other
non-job-related solicitations."' 93 Suzi Prozanski, an employee and the
union president, sent out three e-mails including one that requested each
employee "to wear green to support the [u]nion's position in [the
upcoming] negotiations."1 94 The company then reprimanded her for the
non-work usage of the company e-mail system. 195
The union filed a claim with the NLRB and the judge found that
there was no violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by maintaining a
company-wide e-mail usage policy, but the employer did violate this
section by discriminatorily allowing other types of e-mail that were not
associated with work. 19 6 On appeal, the NLRB dismissed the allegations
that the employer's application of the policy was discriminatory.' 97 The
NLRB went on to analyze the NLRA, specifically section 7 and section
8(a)(1), finding that there was "no statutory right [for the employees] to
use the [employer's] e-mail system for [s]ection 7 matters."1 98 As
previously determined, an employer has a basic property right to
"regulate and restrict employee use of company property."'

99

Thus, the

employer was able to keep the employee from using the e-mail system
maintained and operated by the employer. °0
In other cases, the NLRB has held that there is "'no statutory right.
to use an employer's equipment or media,' as long as the restrictions

a request
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
1983)).
200.

runs afoul of the NLRA).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
351 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (Dec. 16, 2007).
See id., slip op. at 1.
Id., slip op. at 2.
Id., slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at2.
Id., slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at 5.

Id.
Id., slip op. at 7 (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663-64 (6th Cir.
Id.
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are nondiscriminatory." 0 ' The NLRB went further to state that the
employer's rule did not entirely deprive the employees of their right to
communicate with each other in the workplace or on their own time.20 2
Thus, the employer's policy was held to be nondiscriminatory because
there was no proof that the employer permitted the employees to "use email to solicit support for or [participate] in any outside cause or
organization[s], 20 3 If the employer allowed employees to use the e-mail
system or other communications systems for non-work-related purposes,
' '2
"it may not 'validly discriminate against notice of union meetings. 04
However, there is nothing in the NLRA that prohibits the employer from
drawing distinctions "between invitations for an organization and
invitations of a personal nature, . . . and between business-related use
and non-business-related use., 20 5 The NLRB adopted a new definition
of what unlawful discrimination would be comprised of, reasoning that it
would be "disparate treatment of activities or communications of a
similar character because of their union or other [section] 7-protected
status ....
Under this new definition, the denial of the use of the
company e-mail system to solicit union membership and participation is
not considered unlawful discrimination.20 7
In reaching this conclusion, the NLRB compared e-mails to
telephone calls, as they both constitute "instant communication[s]
regardless of the distance, both are transmitted electronically, usually
through wires ... over complex networks, and both require specialized
electronic devices for their transmission., 20 8 The NLRB then noted that
it "has never found that employees have a general right to use their
employer's telephone system for [s]ection 7 communications. 2 9
201. Id., slip op. at 5 (quoting Mid-Mountain Foods, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000),
enforced, 11 Fed. App'x 372 (4th Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., Champion Int'l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102,

109 (1991) ("[Employer] does have a basic right to regulate and restrict employee use of company
property."); Union Carbide Corp. Nuclear Div., 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (1981) ("[Employer] could
unquestionably bar its telephones to any personal use by employees."), enforced, 714 F.2d 657 (6th

Cir. 1983).
202. Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 6 (noting that face-to-face solicitation
remained unregulated in the workplace, and that "employees ... have the full panoply of rights to

engage in oral solicitation on nonworking time and also to distribute literature on nonworking time
in nonwork areas").
203. Id., slip op. at 8.
204.
405 (8th
205.
206.

Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1402 (1982) (citations omitted), enforced, 722 F.2d
Cir. 1983).
Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 9.
Id., slip op. at 10.

207.

Id., slip op. at 10 n. 24.

208.

Id., slip op. at 7.

209.

Id.
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The dissent in Register Guard, on the other hand, determined that
e-mails are not akin to telephone calls and focused on NLRB decisions
holding that an employer may limit an employee's utilization of an
employer's equipment provided it does so in a nondiscriminatory
manner with regard to uses that are not related to work.2" ° These
previous cases did not involve "sophisticated networks designed to
accommodate thousands of multiple, simultaneous, interactive
exchanges."2
Unlike e-mail, when an employee was on the telephone
doing union business, the phone lines became unavailable for use by
other employees. 21 2 An "'overriding consideration has always been that
an employee should not tie up phone lines' for personal use."2t 3
However, in this particular situation, the e-mail system used by the
employees did not inhibit e-mail usage by other employees.21 4
Nevertheless, the majority in Register Guard determined that emails should be treated analogously to telephone calls, 215 providing
courts with a stepping stone on how to view e-mail protests. Although
Register Guard did not involve secondary picketing, the NLRB did not
allow solicitation by a union of the union's own members at the
company where the members worked.216 For secondary picketing
determinations, coercive conduct is the key to the analysis. 21 7 As the
NLRB analogizes e-mails to telephone calls, the court should focus on
their coercive effects on secondary employers. Much like the e-mail in
Register Guard, if employees at one workplace e-mail or call a
secondary workplace to garner support for a labor dispute in which the
secondary workplace has no involvement, this e-mail or call should be
restricted.218
In Printing Specialties & Paper Converters Union v. Le Baron,2 19
the court found that the union picket of a secondary company's trucks
carrying the primary company's cargo constituted an illegal secondary

210. Id., slip op. at 16 (dissenting opinion).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting Churchill's Supermarkets, Inc., 8-CA-13944-1; -13944-2; -14243 (A.L.J.
Aug. 18, 1981), reprinted in 185 N.L.R.B. 138, 147 (1987), enforced, 857 F.2d 1474 (6th Cir.
1988)).
214. Id.,slipop. at 17.
215. Id., slip op. at 7 (majority opinion).
216. Seeid.,slipop.at 1.
217. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S.
58, 68 (1964).
218. See id. at 72.
219. 171 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1948).
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picket and could be restricted.22 0 Union representatives informed the
employees of the secondary company that the trucks contained "hot
cargo," and requested that they not load or unload them, thereby causing
the employees to refuse to handle the cargo of the company the union
was picketing. 221 The purpose of the in-person comments were to
induce action by the secondary employees, namely, that they not handle
Thus, LeBaron is similar to
the primary employer's products. 2
Register Guard, where a form of instant communication was used to
induce action by members of their own company to wear green in order
to promote the union. 23
The message itself does not have to be coercive, but if the conduct
was meant to have a coercive effect on the secondary employer, then it is
considered prohibited secondary picketing.2 24 Telephone conversations,
in-person solicitation, and e-mail would arguably produce the same
amount of pressure and coercion. If an e-mail like that in Register
Guard would have been sent to a secondary employer, not only would
the employees violate the employer's internal e-mail policies, but it
could be viewed as a secondary picketing violation as well. Asking
other employees in the secondary employer's company to wear green or
in any other way show their support for the union may amount to
unlawful signal picketing. 225 If the e-mails in Register Guard had been
sent to a secondary employer, the court might also have found them in
violation of the NLRA's publicity proviso. 2 6 The message to wear
green and the message to take part in the union's entry into a local
parade both called for employees to take action in support of the
hiwol1
union. 227 This
would likely fall under the publicity proviso because such
activities would be "inducing [other] individual[s] employed by any
person other than the primary employer . . . not to perform any

services.,,228 Any employee who received the e-mails and followed their
directions to support the union, would be inclined not to perform any

220. Id. at 334.
221. Id. at 333.
222.
223.
224.

LeBaron, 171 F.2d at 334.
Guard Publ'g Co. (Register Guard),351 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 3, 7 (Dec. 16, 2007).
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1957).

225. See Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Case No.
28-CC-933/JD(SF)-30-03, 46-47 (NLRB Div. of Judges, May 9, 2003) (quoting IBEW, Local 98,

327 N.L.R.B. 593, 593 n.3 (1999)) (additional citations omitted) (discussing activity signaled to
"neutrals that 'sympathetic action on their part is desirable by the union.').
226. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
227.
228.

Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 3.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (2000).
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services for the primary company and would put pressure on his or her
own employer to keep them from doing business with the primary
company, which is what the secondary picketing provision of the NLRA
was designed to prohibit.2 29
C. Unions Using Spare E-mails as a Communication Tool
In order for an e-mail to be considered spam, it must be, among
many things, commercial in nature.230 An e-mail is commercial in
nature if it 'proposes a commercial transaction' or promotes specific
products or services. 231 The Supreme Court has found that laborrelated speech may indeed be commercial in nature.23 2 It is from this
decision, that labor-related speech in electronic format can now be seen
to have overcome one of the elements of being considered spam e-mail.
In 2007, the Aitken 233 Court stated that unions "perform[]
economically valuable services for members in exchange for fees,
namely union dues., 234 The court categorized the unsolicited e-mails
sent by the union to promote membership as a commercial transaction. 235
The court went on to decide that solicitation to join a union encourages
commercial activity that would fall within the purview of the CANSPAM Act. 23 6 The e-mail, according to the court, does not have to
solicit money or bring about an instant transaction, but may promote a
future transaction.2 37
Thus, mass e-mail sent to a secondary employer for the purposes of
soliciting support may also be considered a commercial transaction as
well as a commercial e-mail under the CAN-SPAM Act since the
definition includes "any electronic message the primary purpose of
which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial
product or service (including content on an Internet website operated for

229.
230.

See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1750.
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,15 U.S.C. §§ 7702(2)(A), 7704(a)(1)-(2), (5) (2006).

231.

Aitken v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 496 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (E.D. Va. 2007) (quoting

Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989)) (citing Vill. of Schaumburg

v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
232. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576
(1988).
233.

496 F. Supp. 2d 653 (E.D. Va. 2007).

234.

Id. at 665.

235.

Id.

236.
237.

Id.

Id. at 666.
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a commercial purpose)., 238
Further, mass e-mails sent to other
employees soliciting membership or support might be seen as a
secondary picket if they put economic pressure on a secondary employer
to stop doing business with a primary employer,23 9 or if the intended
effect was inducing individuals employed by others to not perform
services for a primary employer.24 °
D. Inserting a Hyperlink into the E-mail Message
E-mail communication allows the sender to insert hyperlinks, or
"electronic link[s] providing direct access from one distinctively marked
place in a hypertext or hypermedia document to another in the same or a
different document., 241 A hyperlink would allow the sender of the email to bypass the direct inclusion of text meant to solicit members or to
gain support for the union. This may mean that the e-mail is not
commercial in nature or may not have as much coercive effect because
the e-mail requires the viewer to take additional steps to see the
message. However, if the link is to a website, then the website analysis
must be done by the courts, as previously discussed, to determine if the
communication could be considered secondary picketing.242
The e-mail may be considered unlawful secondary picketing if the
conduct involved by the message in the e-mail or in the document
attached to the hyperlink, was meant to have a coercive effect on the
employer. 243 The court, or NLRB, should also analyze the e-mail under
the publicity proviso in the NLRA and determine whether the underlying
message was to prevent the secondary employers from performing
services for the primary employer.244

238.
239.

CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7702(2)(A) (2006).
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S.

58, 63 (1964).
240.

National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000).

241. Merriam-Webster
Online,
Dictionary,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hyperlink (last visited Sept. 22, 2008); see also Julia Alpert Gladstone,
Finding What You Need in the World of Information in WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
THE INTERNET: POWERFUL STRATEGIES AND PRACTICAL USES 1998, at 33 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,

Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-525, 1998)
242.
243.
244.

See supra text accompanying notes 178-182.
See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1957).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
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V. CONCLUSION

The future of protests is likely to move online and towards Internetbased activities. The NLRB and the courts need to determine the
permissible parameters of how and if certain forms of electronic
methods of protest may be used through comparison with more
established media. Courts will likely continue to analyze protests
through the goggles of picketing versus non-picketing to decide what
can and cannot be limited.
Using this analysis, the determination should be made considering
all relevant technological aspects of these new methods of protest to
guide employers and unions in their actions. Recent NLRB decisions
have shed some light onto how Internet-based activities will be treatedcomparable to telephone calls, in the case of e-mails. This comparison
remains to be held an appropriate one. Consequently, actors in today's
labor disputes engage in Internet activity with the risk of running afoul
of the NLRA.
In order to make appropriate determinations, a clear understanding
of the intricate technicalities associated with the technology involved is
essential. There may be no easy solution in light of the unique aspects
involved with websites, e-mails, and hyperlinks. Building on the
foundations established by case law and the policies meant to be
furthered by legislative acts, a solution is likely viable. Secondary
protests will thus soon see a transition, both legal and practical, from the
use of traditional methods of protest, such as an inflatable rat, to the use
of the mouse in a cyber-protest.
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